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I. INTRODUCTION
Markets are becoming more complicated in an ever faster changing 
world. At the same time, new findings pertaining to human behavior
and consumer markets constantly challenge traditional legal and policy
assumptions.1 More specifically, social science offers a myriad of insights into 
the ways trust, identity, ideology, and preferences interact and impact one
another.2 
A sensible consumer law policy requires an interdisciplinary and holistic 
approach.3  Recent scholarship has acknowledged this need while proposing 
novel perspectives that enrich academic discourse and development of 
consumer law policy.  Along these lines, a growing body of literature
examines how notions such as identity and trust affect consumer behavior 
and how the law should respond to these phenomena.4 
However, this body of literature is in its infancy and is therefore under- 
developed. This Article bridges some of this gap, proposing a fresh and
multi-dimensional approach.  While focusing on country of origin cases, 
it demonstrates how incorporating behavioral, economic, and social insights 
may yield a superior legal regime. Notably, an agenda that considers how 
sellers can manipulate consumers’ trust is applicable to the development 
of consumer law more generally.
Country of Origin statements have been regulated by consumer law for
some time now.  In the United States, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”5  According
to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), “a Made in USA claim, like any
other objective advertising claim, must be truthful and substantiated.”6 
Indeed, the FTC tags all its documents relating to false “Made in the USA” 
1. See generally, e.g., EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2018).
2. For a review of different types of human interactions and an examination of
whether and how the notion of trust should impact legal regulation, see generally Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A 
Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717 (2006). 
3. This is valid in various contexts.  For concrete proposals with respect to the 
design of consumer protection laws see generally, for example, Shmuel I. Becher,
Unintended Consequences and the Design of Consumer Protection Legislation, 93 TUL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018).
4. See generally, e.g., Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863 (2018); 
Justin Sevier & Kelli Alces Williams, Consumers, Seller-Advisors, and the Psychology of 
Trust, 59 BOS. C.L. REV. 931 (2018). 
5.  15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). 
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claims and there have been 179 entries—with 140 enforcement measures
—since 1999.7  At the time of writing, the most recent of these was from 
March 26, 2018, for mattresses labeled “Designed and Assembled in the 
USA,” which had in fact been imported—already complete—from China.8 
Interestingly, recent years have seen a steady growth in consumer law
cases concerning country of origin.9  For instance, for the years 1999, 2000, 
and 2001 the FTC reports thirteen Made in USA related matters overall.10 
Yet, for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, eighty-two cases were reported,11 
reflecting an increase of more than fivefold. Simultaneously, there has been
a significant increase in the penalties imposed.  Given the increase in overall 
cases, a stricter policy makes perfect sense.  Country of origin claims may 
7. See Made in the USA, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/consumer­
protection/made-usa [https://perma.cc/E9GZ-3DJK]. 
8. Lesley Fair, Mattress Sellers Stick Buyers with Misleading “USA” Claim, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 26, 2018, 11:16 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/ 
business-blog/2018/03/mattress-sellers-stick-buyers-misleading-usa-claim-0 [https://perma.cc/
Y6XF-H7ZR]; see Nectar Brand LLC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 20, 2018), https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/182-3038/nectar-brand-llc [https://perma.cc/
S6UB- B2CZ].
9. This is in line with the focus of numerous consumer organizations, in the United
States and beyond, on credence qualities. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
VICT., CREDENCE ATTRIBUTES: MAKING HONESTY THE BEST POLICY 4 (2010), https://www. 
consumer.vic.gov.au/library/publications/resources-and-education/research/credence­
attributes-making-honesty-the-best-policy-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS7W-3EPV]; Commission 
Releases 2017/18 Priorities, COM. COMMISSION N.Z. (July 20, 2017), http://www.comcom.
govt.nz/the-commission/media-centre/media-releases/2017/commission-releases-201718- 
priorities/ [https://perma.cc/UTJ2-765T] (“In our consumer area we will focus on . . . credence
claims. . . .When it comes to credence, it is difficult for consumers to verify claims made
about a product, and therefore easy for them to be misled.  In particular, we will be paying 
attention to food products and country of origin claims.”); Commission’s Alpaca Case 
Brings Total Fines to $1.5 Million, COM. COMMISSION N.Z. (May 23, 2017), http://www.
comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/media-centre/media-releases/2017/commissions-alpaca- 
case-brings-total-fines-to-1.5-million/ [https://perma.cc/B6H9-D8PP] [hereinafter Alpaca Case];
Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. 
Consumer Protection Policy, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 19, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/
public-statements/2003/08/federal-trade-commission-and-future-development-us-consumer­
protection [https://perma.cc/2N6Z-PLC6]. 
10. According to the FTC’s registry, there were eight Made in USA related matters 





11. There were twenty-eight such matters in 2015, thirty in 2016, and twenty-four in
2017. Id. 
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signal quality or carry ethical–ideological approval.12  Yet, such claims relate
to credence qualities, which are characteristics that cannot be verified by 
consumers. Furthermore, detecting such claims and initiating litigation
based on misleading ones, is rather challenging and costly.13  Thus, traders
have a strong profit-incentive to exploit consumers’ trust by making
misleading country of origin claims.  As the data show, the FTC indeed
encounters more and more of these cases. 
Mislabeling country of origin is by no means an issue reserved to the
United States.  This has been a source of concern in multiple jurisdictions, 
including Canada,14 Australia,15 and elsewhere. Along these lines, in recent 
years the New Zealand Commerce Commission—which serves an analogous 
function to FTC—has prioritized the policing and prosecution of misleading
or deceptive conduct regarding country of origin.16  Remarkably, the mislabeling 
has occurred disproportionally vis-à-vis products for tourists.17 
Tourists form a consumer group that is particularly vulnerable to misleading 
behavior.  For starters, tourists frequently suffer from language, legal, and 
cultural gaps. Moreover, cognitive biases may lead tourists to willingly 
spend greater amounts of money on something associated with their holiday.
For instance, the behavioral phenomenon dubbed “mental accounting”
suggests people have different “accounts” for different spending purposes.18 
This can result in people being more willing to use money from one account— 
for example, money that is linked to prize winning, gifts, or vacations— 
while being less willing to consume money associated with other accounts— 
for example, money that is related to one’s savings.19  Another important 
12. Cf. Christine Parker, Rachel Carey & Gyorgy Scrinis, The Consumer Labelling
Turn in Farmed Animal Welfare Politics: From the Margins of Animal Advocacy to 
Mainstream Supermarket Shelves, in ALTERNATIVE FOOD POLITICS: FROM THE MARGINS 
TO THE MAINSTREAM (Michelle Phillipov & Katherine Kirkwood eds., forthcoming 2018). 
13. Jessica Palmer, Access to Justice for Consumers, in  CONSUMER LAW IN NEW 
ZEALAND 495, 496–99 (Kate Tokeley ed., 2d ed. 2014) (discussing barriers to justice in
the context of consumers). 
14. See generally, e.g., COMPETITION BUREAU CAN., “PRODUCT OF CANADA” AND 
“MADE IN CANADA” CLAIMS (2009), www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/
eng/03169.html [https://perma.cc/5656-SNT5].
15. See, e.g., Country of Origin Claims, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER
COMMISSION, www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-business/country­
of- origin-claims [https://perma.cc/LF7C-TX2N].
16. Commission Releases 2017/18 Priorities, supra note 9.
17. For a partial, illustrative list of cases, see infra Appendix A. 
18. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 27 MARKETING
SCI. 15, 15 (2008). 
19. See generally id.
542
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cognitive bias is the “focusing illusion.”20 According to this illusion, when 
people focus their attention on a specific decision they are likely to over­
value its importance.21 
Shifting the focus, New Zealand enjoys a relatively high level of trust.22 
Furthermore, there is a premium attached to New Zealand, resulting from its
clean and green image. 23  Following this line of reasoning, deterring firms 
from engaging in misleading or deceptive behavior vis-à-vis tourists is a
rather complex challenge.  Yet, the legal literature neglects to address the
unique characteristics of consumers who are also tourists.
A recent string of New Zealand cases provides an exceptional opportunity to
revisit this topic. Statements regarding country of origin are important for
consumers, traders, and society.  Such claims also affect the notion of trust,
which is an important sociological concept that interacts with markets and the
law.  High trust is correlated with healthier and wealthier societies. Trust
may be threatened when people with diverse backgrounds interact, such 
as when local firms transact with tourists. 
As we demonstrate below, courts are not employing the right framework
and considerations for advancing consumer law in country of origin cases. 
This, we believe, is true in other consumer law cases as well.  Following 
this logic, Part II of this Article systematically and critically examines recent 
“Made in New Zealand” country of origin cases.  Section A contrasts various
cases and points out the erratic nature of the fines imposed.  Thereafter,
Section B demonstrates why these fines do not lead to economic deterrence,
leaving firms with a profit-incentive to misbehave.  Next, Section C examines
how country of origin cases may negatively impact social trust and how this 
should be factored into the legal framework of such cases.  Subsequently, 
Section D explores some other context-dependent characteristics that courts
should consider when assessing country of origin cases. 
20. See, e.g., David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California
Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 340, 340 (1998). 
21. Id.
 22. See MINISTRY SOC. DEV., THE SOCIAL REPORT 2016, at 234–37 (2016), http://social
report.msd.govt.nz/documents/2016/msd-the-social-report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UVT5-T7ZA].
23. Florian Kaefer, Origins and Meaning of ‘Clean, Green’ New Zealand, PLACE
AND BRAND OBSERVER (Sept. 13, 2016), https://placebrandobserver.com/country-reputation­
origins-clean-green-new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/CN6Q-4JCD].
 543
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At the time of writing, the latest of these Made in New Zealand’ cases
was embodied in Commerce Commission v. Topline International, Ltd.24 
This decision related to Topline’s “NatureBee Potential Bee Pollen” 
product, which was labeled as being made in New Zealand.25  In fact, the
bee pollen was sourced from China, was turned into potentiated bee pollen 
in China, and was encapsulated in China. 26  After being imported into
New Zealand, it was then bottled and labeled. 27  As part of this process, 
Topline used the well-known “New Zealand Made” label, with the red
kiwi in a blue and red triangle.28  It also promoted its product by emphasizing 
the various advantages that New Zealand made bee pollen has.29  In May
2017, the District Court at Auckland fined Topline $405,000 and its director 
$121,500 for misleading consumers under section 10 of the Fair Trading
Act 1986 (FTA)—a total of $526,500.30 
These figures, no doubt, reflect the courts’ increasing willingness to impose
high fines in consumer law cases.31  In May 2016, one year prior to Topline, 
Nangong, Ltd. and its owner were convicted of fourteen false claims
charges.32  In this case, the false claims were that duvets contained alpaca 
wool and were made in New Zealand.  The defendants were fined $109,200—
$91,000 and $18,200, respectively.
In comparison, the fine imposed in Topline—$526,500—represents the
next step for country of origin cases.  Such a relatively hefty fine serves to 
deter non-compliance with consumer law.  Considerable media attention, which
the Topline case and a string of alpaca-related cases received,33 might 
24. Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 (N.Z.). 
25. Id. at [17]. 
26. Id. at [14]. 
27. Id. at [14–15]. 
28. Id. at [18]. 
29. Id. at [21]. 
30. Id. at [1], [39].  For a detailed discussion see infra Section II.  Maximum penalty
amounts are detailed in section 40 of the FTA.  Unless otherwise stipulated, amounts are in
New Zealand dollars. 
31. For an additional case from 2017 that illustrates courts’ willingness to impose 
high fines in consumer law cases, see Commerce Comm’n v. Reckitt Benckiser (N.Z.), Ltd.
[2017] NZDC 1956 at [55]. 
32. Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291 (N.Z.). 
33. E.g., Alpaca Case, supra note 9; False Bee Pollen Claims Result in Fines, N.Z.
L. SOC’Y (May 19, 2017), https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/news-and-communications/ 
latest-news/news/false-bee-pollen-claims-result-in-fines [https://perma.cc/S6NP-ZY9C]; “Made
in New Zealand” Bee Pollen was Chinese, COM. COMMISSION N.Z. (May 19, 2017), 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the-commission/media-centre/media-releases/2017/made­
in-new-zealand-bee-pollen-was-chinese/ [https://perma.cc/628L-PVGA]; Holly Ryan, $520k 
544
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additionally increase awareness of the expected norms of behavior. Overall, 
high fines, accompanied by significant publicity, serve as behavioral 
regulators that make the risks associated with dishonest behavior more
vivid and reduce traders’ incentives to misbehave.34 
Despite the imposition of increasingly larger fines,35 we submit that 
penalties are not imposed consistently and are insufficient to meet their
purpose. In the following Section, we inquire into some of the characteristics
of the country of origin decisions.  We argue that penalties might be ill-
suited to achieve their main goals. 
A. The Erratic Nature of Determining Fines 
We begin our analysis with an examination of the fines in relation to
the FTA. Section 40(2) of the FTA states that the aggregate fine imposed 
cannot exceed the maximum penalty for a single charge, if “contraventions
are of the same or a substantially similar nature and occurred at or about 
the same time.”36  Very few cases mention this section in their sentencing 
decisions. However, it appears New Zealand courts generally aggregate 
behavior and presume that this limit applies. 
For example, in Commerce Commission v. Chen, the court noted the 
maximum sentence per charge for a company was $200,000,37 but then set 
the starting point for twelve charges—for conduct that took place over twenty
months—at $200,000.38 Indeed, upon our review of case law, we found only 
two specific discussions regarding the limit.  In Commerce Commission v. Mi
Woollies, Ltd.,39 the court stated that the provision regarding the aggregate fine
Fine for ‘NZ-made’ Pollen Claims, N.Z. HERALD (May 19, 2017, 10:53 AM), http://www.
nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11859047 [https://perma.cc/
B3A4-937C].
34. Media coverage makes risks more readily available in people’s minds, thus 
leading to risk over-estimation.  The term “availability cascades” suggests that people 
perceive risks as more serious when a relevant incident is “readily called to mind or
‘available.’” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (1997). 
35. See infra Appendix A. 
36.  Fair Trading Act 1986, subs 40(2) (N.Z.). 
37. Commerce Comm’n v. Chen DC Auckland CRI 2012-004-019312, 28 March 
2013 at [10] (N.Z.). 
38. Id. at [26]. 
39. Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009­
009069, 31 July 2013 (N.Z.). Judge MacAskill noted “[t]he defendant is liable to a fine 
not exceeding $200,000 for each offense,” but did not explain why the maximum applied 
to the case at hand.  Id. at [5].
 545
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does “not control the maximum fines that can be imposed on the s[ection] 10
charges because they did not occur ‘at or about the same time,’” as the conduct
that occurred between April 2009 and August 2011.40 
In Commerce Commission v. Zenith Corp., Ltd., a case predominantly 
about misleading health claims regarding the product “Body Enhancer,”41 the
Court adopted the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) decision, Ducret v
Colourshot Proprietary, Ltd.42  The FCA interpreted the Australian equivalent to
FTA section 40(2)43 as meaning that acts committed at a two-month interval
could not have reasonably occurred at about the same time.44  Instead,
the acts must take place within “at most” three days to have occurred
at around the same time.45  In terms of whether the contraventions are of
“the same or a substantially similar nature,” the court in Zenith noted the 
“extent and membership of the target audience” of the representations is
relevant, but it is possible that representations in different media are the
same or substantially similar in nature.46 Zenith was upheld on appeal.47 
Let us contrast this with Topline, where the court did not apply section 
40(2).48  Topline and its director each faced twenty-two charges under
section 10 of the FTA pertaining to the period of May 2011 to June 2015.49 
In June 2014, Parliament increased the maximum penalties under the FTA, 
reflecting Parliament’s intent to more severely punish certain misleading 
and deceptive conduct.50  Twelve of the offenses in Topline were subject 
to the previous maximum penalty, while the other ten were subject to the 
new maximum.51  As detailed in Table 1 below, the potential maximum 
penalty in this case was no less than $11,120,000—$8.4 million for Topline
and $2.72 million for its director. 
40. Id. at [6]. This case pertained to FTA, subsection 13(j). Id.
 41. Commerce Comm’n v. Zenith Corp. [2006] DCR 757 at [1] (N.Z.). 
42. Id. at [79] (adopting Ducret v Colourshot Proprietary, Ltd [1981] 35 ALR 503 
(Austl.)).
43. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 79(2) (Austl.).
44. Ducret v Colourshot Proprietary, Ltd [1981] 35 ALR 503 (Austl.). 
45. Id.
 46. Zenith, DCR 757 at [82]. 
47. Zenith Corp. v. Commerce Comm’n [2008] NZHC at [213]–[219] (N.Z.). 
48. Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 (N.Z.). 
49. Id. at [3].
50. See Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291 at [26] (N.Z.).  In this decision, 
the court penalized the company more for a pre-change charge—$63,000—than it did for
a post-change charge—$28,000.  Id. at [33]–[34].  It is unclear why.  The opposite was 
true for the charges against the owner. Id. at [35]–[36]. 
51. Topline, NZDC 9221 at [37]. 
546
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200,000 600,000 60,000 200,000 
Number of
charges
12 10 12 10
Fine 
exposure
2,400,000 6,000,000 720,000 2,000,000
Exposure 
per entity 
2,400,000 + 6,000,000 = 
8,400,000




8,400,000 + 2,720,000 = 11,120,000 
As the offenses in Topline occurred over four years, the different charges
surely cannot have occurred “at or about the same time.”52  Furthermore, 
the representations varied significantly, raising a strong argument that
they were not “of the same or a substantially similar nature.”53  Yet, as 
noted, it seems that the court applied FTA section 40(2).54 
After stating the need to evaluate all surrounding circumstances,55 the
judge then declared that “in [his] view, the appropriate starting point for
sentencing” is a fine of $600,000 for Topline and a fine of $180,000 for 
its director.56  This is despite the fact that the court, in considering the
particular circumstances of the case at hand, emphasized various aggravating 
factors: the “scale of the offending,” the significant period of time, the 
number of consumers involved, and the fact “that consumers . . . cannot 
check the quality and source of the product themselves.”57  The court also
52.  Fair Trading Act 1986, subs 40(2) (N.Z.). 
53. Id.
 54. See Topline, NZDC 9221 at [37].  The court does not explicitly state that it applied 
s 40(2). Id.; see infra Table 2. 
55. Topline, NZDC 9221 at [38]. 
56. Id. at [39]. 
57. Id. at [27]. 
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noted the “blatant,” untrue nature of the statements.58  It then remarked on 
the fact that by using Chinese pollen Topline saved about $684,000, which 
resulted in unfair competition.59 The court further mentioned the “potential
biosecurity risk[s]”60 and the breach of trust.61 Moreover, the court considered
the potential damage to the “MADE IN NEW ZEALAND” brand, as well
as to other exporters—including increased scrutiny of New Zealand products 
62overseas.
The court also considered three mitigating factors.63 First, the defendants 
cooperated with the Commerce Commission.64  Second, the defendants did 
not have “previous convictions.”65  These two mitigating factors were grouped
together to provide a 10% discount.66  Third, “[e]arly guilty pleas were
entered,” and the defendants apologized and removed the misleading 
information.67 A 25% discount was allowed for the “early guilty plea.”68 
As a result, fines were set at $405,000 for Topline and $121,500 for its 
director.69  Table 2 reflects the way the Court broke down the fines. 
58. Id. at [28]. 
59. Id. at [29]. 
60. Id. at [30]. 
61. Id. at [31]. 
62. Id.
 63. Id. at [33]. 
64. Id. 
65. Id.  A lack of prior convictions is generally considered a mitigating factor. See
Commerce Comm’n v. Budget Warehouse, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 14223 at [19] (N.Z.); 
Commerce Comm’n v. Bike Retail Grp., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 2670 at [17] (N.Z.). But see
Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069, 31 July
2013 at [31] (N.Z.) (opining that this was “not a mitigating factor,” but rather “the absence 
of an aggravating factor”). 
66. See Topline, NZDC 9221 at [39]. 
67. Id. at [33]. 
68. Id. at [39]. 
69. Id. 
548
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200,000 600,000 60,000 200,000 
Actual penalty 
per charge
8,750 30,000 3458.33 8,000 
Actual penalty 
in % 
4.38% 5% 5.76% 4%
Number of
charges
12 10 12 10
Fine imposed 105,000 300,000 41,500 80,000 
Fine imposed
per entity 
105,000 + 300,000 =
405,000










405,000 + 121,500 = 526,500
The court did not provide any further explanation as to the amount of 
the imposed fines.70  Despite finding the conduct at issue particularly 
odious, the court applied less than 5% of the maximum penalty.71  While
the court translated the mitigating factors to concrete discount figures— 
10% and 25%—it did not give the aggravating factors any numerical
significance.72 
On top of that, courts apply discounts in a seemingly incoherent way.
Courts either apply the discounts sequentially, cumulatively, or globally.
For example, in Topline, the court applied discounts sequentially: the 10% 
discount for cooperation and no previous convictions was applied to the 
70. See generally id.
71. See id. at [39]. 
72. See id.
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starting point sum of $600,000 for Topline and $180,000 for the director; 
the 25% discount for early guilty pleas was not applied to the principal 
amount but to the 10% discounted amount.73  The court made the following 
calculation: $600,000 – 10% = $540,000 and then $540,000 – 25% = $405,000.74 
This is not uncommon.75 However, it is arguably illogical to apply the
two discounts in two distinct phases, as both pertain to the same issue and 
behavior.
The cumulative approach involves adding the discounts and applying 
them to the principal.  For example, if the court in Topline had applied the 
two discounts to the original amount, the calculation would have been
600,000 – (10% + 25%) = 390,000; that is, $15,000 less.  The cumulative 
approach is also not uncommon.  In Hou (the alpaca-related decision regarding 
Nangong, Ltd.), the court applied a 25% discount for the guilty plea and
a 5% discount for the absence of prior convictions and cooperation, equating
to 30% off the starting point.76 
In contrast, sometimes courts will simply state that all the mitigating 
factors are worth a certain numerical discount combined, without giving
any percentage or method of calculation.77 We have dubbed this “a global
approach.” In rarer cases, it is wholly unclear how ultimate penalties are
determined.78 
Furthermore, our concerns are exacerbated by the incoherent and 
unsystematic ways courts regard other factors, such as the defendant’s
 73. Id.
 74. See id.
75. For calculations under the FTA, see Commerce Comm’n v. Budget Warehouse,
Ltd. [2017] NZDC 14223 at [19], [23] (N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Budge Collection,
Ltd. [2016] NZDC 15542 at [42], [44]–[45] (N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies,
Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069, 31 July 2013 at [40]–[46] (N.Z.). For a 
discussion of discounts under the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003, see
generally Commerce Comm’n v. Acute Fin., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 13866 (N.Z.); Commerce 
Comm’n v. Best Buy, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 13575 (N.Z.).  For an example of where the court 
deducted two discounts sequentially under the Health and Safety at Work Act, see 
generally Worksafe N.Z. v. Budget Plastics, (N.Z.) Ltd. [2017] NZDC 17395. 
76. Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291 at [33] (N.Z.); see also
Commerce Comm’n v. Bike Retail Grp., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 2670 at [16]–[21] (N.Z.); 
Commerce Comm’n v. Reckitt Benckiser (N.Z.), Ltd. [2017] NZDC 1956 at [52]–[55] 
(applying the two discounts to the original amount, although not in an implicit and
arithmetically accurate way); Commerce Comm’n v. Chen DC Auckland CRI 2012-004­
019312, 28 March 2013 at [10] (N.Z.). 
77. Commerce Comm’n v. Anwer [2016] NZDC 25266 at [8] (N.Z.).  In a sentencing 
decision for FTA section 13, Judge Field held that cooperation and a guilty plea represented a
$45,000 reduction—of $105,000—without giving any percentages or method of calculation. 
Id.; see also Commerce Comm’n v. Trustpower, Ltd. [2016] NZDC 18850 at [14]–[16] 
(N.Z.).
78. See R v. Princess Wool Co. [2017] NZDC 12227 at [22]–[26] (N.Z.).  The numbers
and percentages given do not match up. 
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financial position and ability to pay, when determining a penalty.  In some
cases, courts are willing to factor in the ability to pay when determining 
the penalty.79 In Commerce Commission v. Best Buy Ltd., the court gave
a 5% discount, as the defendant could show a deterioration in the volume 
of sales.80 In Commerce Commission v. Frozen Yoghurt Ltd., the defendants
had gone into liquidation.81  The court noted that the business had functioned 
through franchises.82  Thus, to ensure that unsecured creditors were not 
unfairly affected, the court reduced the overall fine by approximately 77%,
from $300,000 down to $70,000.83  In contrast, in Commerce Commission 
v. Hyeon Co., the court found it irrelevant that a defendant had ceased trading 
and fined the company and its director $105,000 and $24,500 respectively
for FTA section 10 violations.84  Yet, in other cases, there appears to be
some room to argue “double accounting” when the director is also a
shareholder or there are two directors charged.85 
In spite of the abovementioned criticisms, one should not be overly
surprised by the inconsistency in penalties.  One study found that although 
juries tend to agree in their moral judgments, they nevertheless provided 
“erratic” monetary awards.86  That is, the translation or quantification of
79. For instance, in Mi Woollies, the court showed readiness to consider the
defendant’s financial position and ability to pay any fine imposed, but this was not raised 
as a consideration.  Mi Woollies, DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069 at [27]; see also
Bike Retail Grp., NZDC 2670 at [18] (“Obviously, the level of penalty [$800,000] that has 
to be imposed is significant and will be a burden to the company.  That burden is not too 
great for the company to bear and I have made the enquiries as to the level of fines being
within the means of the company.  I am assured that they are.”).
80. Best Buy Ltd., NZDC 13575 at [25].  The court was unwilling to give a larger discount, 
as the company was still in trade. Id. 
81. Commerce Comm’n v. Frozen Yoghurt Ltd. [2016] NZDC 19792 at [24] (N.Z.). 
82. Id. at [25]. 
83. Id. at [26]–[29]. 
84. Commerce Comm’n v. Hyeon Co. DC Rotorua CRI-2012-063-004546, 6 August 
2013 at [26], aff’d, [2014] NZHC 1836 (N.Z.); see also Mobile Trader Fined Despite Being
Liquidated, COM. COMMISSION N.Z. (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.comcom.govt.nz/the­
commission/media-centre/media-releases/2018/mobile-trader-fined-despite-being-liquidated/ 
[https://perma.cc/8HUN-AS8N] (reporting Appenture Marketing Limited was fined $114,000 
for eighteen charges under the FTA, and six charges under the Credit Contracts and Consumer
Finance Act 2003, despite having gone into liquidation, for deterrence and because conviction 
could result in some return of funds to consumers). 
85. See Premium Alpaca, NZHC 1836 at [37]; Commerce Comm’n v. Chen DC Auckland 
CRI 2012-004-019312, 28 March 2013 at [23] (N.Z.). 
86. Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and 
Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 49 
(1998). 
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moral judgement into financial awards yields unpredictable results.  As 
one court noted, no “formula or method of calculation or any other tool or 
template to guide the Court” exists.87  Rather, sentencing is an “evaluative
exercise” dependent on the exact facts at hand.88  But this “evaluative exercise” 
is highly subjective.89 
We are not saying the courts should have imposed the maximum penalty
in cases such as Topline or that there is a one size fits all formula to be 
applied in all cases.  We are, however, concerned with how the starting 
point is decided and the discounts applied.  The analysis reveals a confusing
and inconsistent legal landscape, which is hard to explain or justify.
Unfortunately, these concerns are intensified by some other aspects, such as
lack of economic deterrence, to which we now turn.
B. Lack of Economic Deterrence 
Our next claim is that fines imposed for breaches of the FTA do not 
provide the necessary deterrence effect.90 As noted in Topline, “[d]eterrence
must be a principal sentencing factor and consequences need to be imposed
to discourage commercially unethical behaviour.”91  This aligns with the
Sentencing Act of 2002.92  Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the fines actually 
deter such behavior.  Let us take a closer look at the financial findings in 
some of the country of origin decisions. 
Determining the profit gained from misleading or deceptive conduct might 
not always be feasible.  The court might not have enough information.93 
This was not the case in Topline.94  To begin with, the court noted that
Topline
would not have had a business without the pollen imported from China.  The
pollen from China was also cheaper.  It is estimated that by using the Chinese
based pollen instead of the unavailable New Zealand pollen the defendants made 
87. Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009­
009069, 31 July 2013 at [14] (N.Z.). 
88. Id.; see also Commerce Comm’n v. Budge Collection, Ltd. [2016] NZDC 15542 
at [41]. 
89. See Mi Woollies, DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069 at [14].
90. For a discussion on penalties under section 40 of the FTA and a survey of 
the relevant factors in determining fines—including those cases where more substantial 
fines should be imposed—see Debra Wilson, Consumer Information, in CONSUMER LAW 
IN NEW ZEALAND, supra note 13 at 125, 166 nn.220–23; see also Commerce Comm’n v.
Bike Retail Grp., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 2670 at [18] (N.Z.). 
91. Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 at [26] (N.Z.). 
92. See Sentencing Act 2002, ss 7–8 (N.Z.). 
93. See, e.g., Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291 at [24] (N.Z.). 
94. See generally Topline, NZDC 9221. 
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a saving of $683,857.61 on what the pollen would have cost if it could have been
sourced in New Zealand.95 
From a deterrence perspective, then, imposing a $526,500 fine makes 
no economic sense.  If a business can save approximately $684,000 by behaving
illegally, a $526,500 fine still leaves businesses with an improper ex ante
incentive to breach the law.  Given the prevalence of under-enforcement
in consumer markets and the fact that businesses are generally risk neutral, 
the fine in such cases should be considerably higher.  In fundamental economic 
terms, the expected value of a breach must not be positive.  Without offsetting 
the economic incentive to behave unethically, the fine cannot realize its objective
and be economically efficient. 
Another financial fact noted in the court’s opinion furthers our suspicion 
toward the effectiveness of the fine.  The judge stated that “NatureBee 
is Topline’s flagship product and accounts for the majority of its revenue 
of between $3.4 million and $4.9 million annually.”96 In other words, during 
the four years that Topline made untrue representations, the company’s 
revenue was approximately $16 million.  Recall that Chinese pollen was 
central to Topline’s business.  With no evidence to the contrary, it should 
be questionable whether a fine that captures about 3% of the trader’s revenue
suffices.
This is not a problem specific to Topline. Other cases also indicate that 
the starting point is not determined in relation to the defendant’s gain. 
Instead, the courts adopt a totality principle, where the overall criminality
is evaluated and a proportionate penalty is imposed.97 That is, the starting 
point for fines in consumer law is essentially calculated with reference to
how unscrupulous the defendant’s behavior is compared to other cases.  In
this context courts consider how widespread, long, misleading, deceptive,
and purposeful the conduct at stake was.  Courts also consider the vulnerability
of the target consumer and the defendant’s reaction to dealings with the 
Commerce Commission’s warnings and compliance letters. The courts
then scale accordingly.98
 95. Id. at [29]. 
96. Id. at [10]. 
97. Commerce Comm’n v. Hyeon Co. DC Rotorua CRI-2012-063-004546, 6
August 2013 at [25], aff’d, [2014] NZHC 1836 (N.Z.). 
98. See generally, e.g., Commerce Comm’n v. Acute Fin., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 13866 
(N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Best Buy, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 13575 (N.Z.); Commerce
Comm’n v. Bike Retail Grp., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 2670 (N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v.
Budget Warehouse, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 14223 (N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Fujitsu Gen. 
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Consider, for instance, Mi Woollies, a case dealing with sheepskin footwear
labeled “UGG New Zealand” and “New Zealand Owned & Operated.”99 
In fact, the footwear was made in China from predominantly Australian
sheepskin.100  Judge MacAskill noted:
In cases of this kind the courts have, at least on occasions, acted on the “principle” 
that it is appropriate that fines imposed should neutralise the profits gained so as 
to discourage unlawful conduct and that a premium should be added for deterrence.
However, this may be simplistic and unjust and does not appear to sit comfortable 
with the provisions of the Sentencing Act 2002.101 
The court had stated that the gross profit made from sales of the misleadingly 
labeled footwear was $375,000.102  However, the court declined to “neutralise”
any profit made.103  As discussed above, the court emphasized that there
is no one formula or method to calculate penalties, as sentencing can only be 
done on a case-by-case basis.104  The court then fined Mi Woollies $63,000.105 
The penalty in Commerce Commission v. BGV International, Ltd. was
similarly dubiously low.106  The defendant—among other things—sold alpaca
rugs labeled “made in New Zealand” although they were from Peru.107 
BGV received approximately $3.2 million in sales and income over the 
period of offending.108  Sales of the offending alpaca rugs constituted “46 
percent of the total sales value”—or $1,472,000.109  The defendant sold
the rugs for between $2,000 and $4,000; their retail value was between
$1,000 and $1,600.110  Even if we presume the smallest mark-up, $2,000 –
$1,600 = $400, this is 20%, which is $294,400 of the revenue received for 
the offending rugs.  The $22,000 penalty imposed is less than 10% of this. 
N.Z., Ltd. [2017] NZDC 21512 (N.Z.); R v. Princess Wool Co. [2017] NZDC 12227
(N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Trustpower, Ltd. [2016] NZDC 18850 (N.Z.); Commerce
Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291(N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. L D Nathan & Co.
[1990] 2 NZLR 160 (N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 
2012-009-009069, 31 July 2013 at [30]–[36] (N.Z.). 
99. Mi Woollies, DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069 at [8].
100. Id. at [16]. 
101. Id. at [29]. 
102. Id. at [9].
103. Id. at [29] (“[T]he Court has no information about the net profitability of the
defendant with respect to this product line or generally.”). 
104. Id. at [14]; see also Commerce Comm’n v. Budge Collection, Ltd. [2016] NZDC
15542 at [41] (N.Z.). 
105. Mi Woollies, DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069 at [44]. 
106. See Commerce Comm’n v. BGV Int’l, Ltd. DC Auckland CRI-2012-004-017226,
23 October 2014 at [26] (N.Z.). 
107. Id. at [1].
108. Id. at [10]. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at [12]. 
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There are other examples,111 and it is rare to find a decision where the
penalty is higher than the estimated gain.112 
Arguably, lower penalties might be justified because the defendants in 
these cases suffered—in addition to the fine imposed—from negative reputation, 
embarrassment, and shaming.  After all, Topline and Mi Woollies are criminal
cases. Criminal procedures in and of themselves represent some deterrence.
Certainly, courts might legitimately factor these components into their 
analyses.113 
However, later cases rejected similar claims.  In Hou, the defendant sought 
to have a discharge without conviction on the basis of the cultural shame 
associated with a criminal conviction, especially in the Chinese community.114 
However, the court declined this request due to the indication from 
Parliament—by increasing maximum penalties—that such offending is
 111. See generally, e.g., Premium Alpaca Ltd. v. Commerce Comm’n [2014] NZHC
1836 (N.Z.); Commerce Comm’n v. Wild Nature NZ Ltd. DC Auckland CRI-2012-063­
003511, 12 December 2014; Commerce Comm’n v. Chen DC Auckland CRI 2012-004­
019312, 28 March 2013 (N.Z.).  The court in Chen noted that over the twenty-month 
period in which the charges fell, the two defendant companies had made almost $6 million 
in revenue. Id. at [9].  Despite the “large degree of willfulness,” the penalty for the
mislabeled rugs—plus other misleading and deceptive conduct—of $259,000 for the two 
companies and their directors seems quite insufficient. Id. at [10], [26]–[29].  See also Wild
Nature Sentencing Concludes Souvenir Company Prosecutions for Misleading Tourists—




112. In another alpaca case, the unlawful gain was estimated to be $21,400, but the 
overall penalties against the company and the director were $57,000 and $14,250, respectively,
totaling $71,250.  Commerce Comm’n v. Budge Collection, Ltd. [2016] NZDC 15542 at 
[14], [17], [44]–[46] (N.Z.).  The court was concerned with the wilfulness and brazen nature of
the director’s behaviour, as the Commerce Commission had warned the director, sent a 
compliance letter, and provided him with FTA education materials. Id. at [29]. In Commerce 
Commission v. Hou, the gain was said to be around $39,000 over a longer period than the 
charge period, but the company and director were penalized $91,000 and $18,200, respectively, 
totalling $109,200.  Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291 at [29], [33]–[36] 
(N.Z.). The misrepresentations were considered to be wilful, “deliberate[,] and systematic.” Id. 
at [19]. 
113. In 2013, prior to the increase in maximum penalties, the court in Mi Woollies 
noted that the defendant did not argue it might suffer financially as a result of adverse publicity
resulting from the prosecution. Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch 
CRI 2012-009-009069, 31 July 2013 at [28] (N.Z.).  One could interpret this as a signal of
the court’s potential willingness to consider the effects of bad publicity in determining the 
penalty. 
114. Hou, NZDC 9291 at [5], [10]. 
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“to be taken seriously.”115  Along these lines, in the 2017 Best Buy case, 
pertaining to Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003, the court 
was unwilling to reduce the penalty in light of the bad publicity the defendant
had received.116 The court noted that bad publicity arising from prosecution
is “a consequence of the criminal offending and to allow the defendant a 
discount for the normal consequences of its offending would seem illogical.”117 
Given these cases, it is implausible to justify recent low penalties by reference
to the negative reputation and bad publicity from which defendants suffer. 
C. Trust and Credence Qualities 
There are additional considerations that support imposing higher fines 
in country of origin cases.  First, such claims affect consumer trust and
enforcement resources.  This section focuses on that aspect. 
Trust is a fundamental component in modern societies. It is a general
quality, closely related to well-being, notions about community, income,
growth, and health.118  Consumer trust in the marketplace is everywhere
and is essential for the proper functioning of markets.119  Hence, trust benefits 
consumers, traders, and markets more generally. 
Globalization processes, which connect numerous people from different 
cultures, further emphasize the importance of trust.120 For globalized markets 
to flourish, consumers need to trust governments, financial institutions,
overseas producers, international and foreign traders, unfamiliar market
players, and intermediate bodies and agencies.  Thin trust—which is relevant 
in the context of unfamiliar parties that employ reputation and norms—is 
mostly relevant for globalized markets.  It is a useful tool that allows one
to “extend the radius of trust beyond the horizon of first-hand experience.”121 
At the same time, trust becomes more fragile as the interaction between
the various players takes place in a more diverse and varied setting.
 115. Id. at [15]. 
116.  Commerce Comm’n v. Best Buy, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 13575 at [24] (N.Z.). 
117. Id.
 118. Cf. MAREK KOHN, TRUST: SELF-INTEREST AND THE COMMON GOOD 133 (2008)
(“Trust is desirable in itself. . . . Trust is to be sought for its own sake, and because it keeps 
good company.”); Eric M. Uslaner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569,
575–81 (2000) (discussing trust’s consequences). 
119.  Here we do not refer to trust among friends, neighbors, or family members—
“[b]onding social capital”—but to trust more broadly—“bridging . . . social capital.” ROBERT
D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 23
(2000). For an accessible economic review of how trust impacts transactions, see Niko 
Matouschek, Trust in Transactions: An Economist’s Perspective, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT.,
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/trust-project/videos/matouschek-ep-1.aspx [https://
perma.cc/MA8T-ZPTN].
120. Cf. KOHN, supra note 118, at 85–86, 131. 
121. Id. at 90 (citing PUTNAM, supra note 119, at 136). 
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Unfortunately, diversity and heterogeneity can easily lower trust—especially 
in the short-run.122 
Trust is embedded in country of origin statements,123 which have multiple
dimensions. Yet, trust and country of origin cases do not get the attention 
they deserve.  From an economic perspective, trust reduces transaction costs
by minimizing the need to take precautions against opportunism.124  When
parties trust one another, the need to examine the other parties’ claims and 
statements is reduced.125  Indeed, consumer law intends to promote trust
and confidence in markets.126 
Where consumers can trust sellers’ statements regarding country of origin, 
such statements may convey important information.  First and foremost,
country of origin statements may serve as a signal of quality.127  For instance, 
consider German cars, Belgium chocolate, Swiss watches, French wines, and
122. Numerous studies point this out. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 118, at 94 (“High 
ethnic diversity is associated with low social trust in report from the United States, 
Australia, Sweden, Canada, and Britain.”); Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and
Community in the Twenty-first Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137 (2007). But see generally Maria Abascal & Delia
Baldassarri, Love Thy Neighbor? Ethnoracial Diversity and Trust Reexamined, 121 AM.
J. SOC. 722 (2015) (finding ethnic diversity negatively predicts trust only for whites); Tom
van der Meer & Jochem Tolsma, Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohesion, 
40 ANN. REV. SOC. 459 (2014) (finding that ethnic diversity has limited social negative 
consequences).
123. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 118, at 10 (“[O]f all the actions that trust is considered
with, few are more critical than the act of telling the truth.”).
124. See, e.g., Gimun Kim & Hoonyoung Koo, The Causal Relationship Between 
Risk and Trust in the Online Marketplace: A Bidirectional Perspective, 55 COMPUTERS
HUM. BEHAV. 1020, 1025 (2015) (“[T]rust continues to reduce perceived risk over
time . . . . The end result is that buyers trust to the point that their intention to engage in 
transactions is decisively enhanced, and perceived risk begins to encourage purchase 
behavior rather than discouraging buyers from engaging in transactions.”); Stephen Knack 
& Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country
Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1252 (1997) (“Individuals in higher-trust societies 
spend less to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transactions.”); Paul J. 
Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295, 296 (2001) (“Because trust 
reduces the cost of transactions ([that is,] less time is spent investigating one’s broker),
high trust societies produce more output than low trust societies.”). 
125. Or as Putnam puts it, “[h]onesty and trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of
social life.” PUTNAM, supra note 119, at 118. 
126. See, e.g., Fair Trading Act 1986, s 2, sch 3, cl 1A(1) (N.Z.). 
127. See generally, e.g., Philip Kotler & David Gertner, Country as Brand, Product, 
and Beyond: A Place Marketing and Brand Management Perspective, 9 BRAND MGMT. 
249 (2002). 
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Canadian maple syrup.  In these examples, country of origin may convey 
quality to consumers.128 
Furthermore, country of origin may imply ideological or ethical values 
which consumers may likewise value.  For instance, consumers may value
Swiss or New Zealand products, which are associated with a clean environment
and eco-friendly production.  In this example, many consumers may purchase 
locally made products to support local businesses and the nation’s economy. 
At the same time, the ideological signal may contain a different aspect. 
For instance, some consumers may wish to refrain from purchasing goods 
manufactured in countries that do not respect human or workers’ rights.129 
Consumers in one country may wish to refrain from purchasing goods 
produced in a rival country.  For instance, Iranian and North Korean citizens
might be reluctant to purchase goods made in or associated with the United 
States.130  Some Jewish consumers may avoid German products, and Australians
may have boycotted French products to protest France’s nuclear testing in 
the South Pacific.131  Either way, country of origin statements can represent 
more than merely dry facts.  As people grow richer and become more 
sophisticated, their search for identity markers increases.132 Country of origin 
information can serve this purpose and promote overall well-being. 
Most Western consumer markets are characterized by minimal transaction 
costs.  Consumers know the price is set and that their interests are protected
by a valuable and relatively effective legal bureaucracy.133  But if consumers 
learn they cannot trust sellers’ statements, the consequences are far-reaching. 
To begin with, consumers will take more precautions and may participate 
less in the market.134  Producers, at the same time, will have to invest more
resources to convince consumers that their statements are genuine.135
 128. See id. at 258 (“A great deal of empirical research has attested that country
images are important extrinsic clues in product evaluations.”).
129. See generally P.H. Howard & P. Allen, Consumer Willingness to Pay for 
Domestic ‘Fair Trade’: Evidence from the United States, 23 RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD
SYSTEMS 235 (2008) (finding consumers were willing to pay significantly more for goods 
produced in ethical ways).
130. See, e.g., Iran Labels 227 US-Made Goods for Boycott, PRESSTV (Dec. 14,
2015, 11:42 AM), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/12/14/441689/Iran-US-goods-boycott­
sanctions [https://perma.cc/8YTK-2RCC].
131.  Kotler & Gertner, supra note 127, at 253. 
132. Cf. Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
133. See generally KOHN, supra note 118, at 25–26. 
134. See, e.g., Kim & Koo, supra note 124, at 1020, 1025. 
135. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1747–50, 1757 
(2001) (“Trust permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a hand shake rather than 
a complex formal contract; it reduces the need to expend resources . . . .”).
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But, more generally, recall that trust is a societal value.136  Social trust 
sustains social networks and social capital.  This, in turn, may encourage 
economic growth137 and promote quality of life.138  Trust is an approach
to life and is critical to many positive outcomes.  Societies characterized
by trust allow individuals to remove excessive guards in various walks of life,
including many that go extensively beyond country of origin statements. 
A trusting environment allows people to not feel the need to continually scrutinize 
everything and everyone.  When one trusts others, preparing for all eventualities
becomes less essential.  As Kohn puts it, people who trust others are optimistic,
happier, tolerant and “welcome dealing with strangers as opportunities rather
than threats.”139  Against this background it is easy to see why eroding
consumers’ trust may negatively affect society at large.140 
The trust dimension in country of origin statements becomes even more
dominant once we think about the nature of these statements.  Economists
divide product attributes into three main categories.141  First are search 
qualities that can be discovered before purchasing a good, including the 
price of a commodity or the texture of a clothing item.142  Second are
experience qualities that can be discovered only after purchase,143 such as 
the taste of cereal in a box or the smell of cologne on one’s body. Third 
136. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 118, at 121 (“[G]eneralized trust describes something
that is at the heart of a good society . . . .”).
137. See, e.g., Knack & Keefer, supra note 124 (presenting evidence that trust and
civic norms impact measurable economic performance); see also Yann Algan & Pierre
Cahuc, Inherited Trust and Growth, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 2060, 2074 (2010).  According
to the authors’ approximation, African countries will experience a five-fold increase in 
GDP should they enjoy the same level of inherited social attitudes as Sweden. Id. 
138. See, e.g., Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Max Roser, Trust, OUR WORLD DATA (2017),
https://ourworldindata.org/trust [https://perma.cc/4PF9-KLYU] (“Trust is a fundamental 
element of social capital—a key contributor to sustaining well-being outcomes, including 
economic development.”). 
139. KOHN, supra note 118, at 123 (referring to Eric Uslaner’s findings). 
140. As Mill explained 170 years ago, “[t]he advantage to mankind of being able to 
trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life: the economical 
is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable.”  1 JOHN STUART MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 150 (5th London ed. 1920) (1848). 






























   




    
 




       




are credence qualities that even frequent use cannot always fully reveal,144 
such as the quality of legal services, whether free-range eggs are indeed 
free-range,145 the country of origin of food,146 or the long-term health benefits
of consuming bee pollen.  Most consumers, as unsophisticated one-shot players, 
are not likely to discover this third category of attributes.
Country of origin claims are credence qualities147 and are therefore of 
rising concern for consumer law proponents.148  Predictably, consumers 
care about such claims and are influenced by them. Made in New Zealand
claims are appealing to domestic buyers, tourists, and overseas consumers.  It
comes as no surprise, then, that the Commerce Commission is dedicating
significant efforts to fight misleading claims regarding country of origin.149 
This is per section 10 of the FTA, as well section 13(j), which specifically
deals with “false or misleading representation[s] concerning the place of
origin of goods or services.”150  Moreover, the Consumers’ Right to Know
(Country of Origin of Food) Bill was introduced into Parliament in December
2016. This Bill aims to make country of origin labels for food mandatory.151 
The regulation is important because language itself dramatically “increase[s] 
the potential for deception.”152  As Kohn opines, “[w]ords are cheap signals
that slash the cost of manipulating others.”153 
On the one hand, the country of origin may embody quality and ethical 
dimensions, and traders would not bother to utilize such claims were they
not beneficial.154  These claims are valuable because “a premium is attached”
 144. See generally Asher Wolinsky, Competition in Markets for Credence Goods, 
151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 117 (1995) (explaining market functioning
as it relates to credence goods); Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics
and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5 
(2006).
145. Commission Charges “Free Range” Egg Farmer, COM. COMMISSION N.Z. (Aug. 
30, 2018), https://comcom.govt.nz/news-and-media/media-releases/2018/commission­
charges-free-range-egg-farmer [https://perma.cc/2UZ6-NJ8U]. 
146. See Consumers’ Right to Know (Country of Origin of Food) Bill 2016, (231­
1), cl 4 (N.Z.).
147. See Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291 at [13] (N.Z.); see also 
Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069, 31 July
2013 at [23] (N.Z.). 
148. See generally, e.g., CONSUMER AFF. VICT., supra note 9.
 149. Commission Releases 2017/18 Priorities, supra note 9.
 150. Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009­
009069, 31 July 2013 at [2] (N.Z.); see also Commerce Comm’n v. Chen DC Auckland 
CRI 2012-004-019312, 28 March 2013 at [2] (N.Z.).
151. The Bill made it through its First Reading in April 2017 and is with the Select 
Committee.  See generally Consumers’ Right to Know (Country of Origin of Food) Bill
2016 (231-1), cl 4 (N.Z.). 
152. KOHN, supra note 118, at 40. 
153. Id.
 154. See Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 at [29] (N.Z.). 
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to goods that are labeled in such ways.155  On the other hand, policing credence
quality claims such as country of origin is challenging and requires many
resources.156  Moreover, trust can be hard to build but easy to ruin and 
extremely challenging to restore.
Law in general and consumer law in particular have an important part in 
this puzzle. If we want to promote trust and social capital, people should
be able to trust the law.  Consumers should be protected when trusting a firm’s 
statement; especially statements that relate to credence qualities.  Most
importantly in our context, individuals should be able to rely on contracts 
and contractual representations.  They should be able to trust authorities 
to penalize those who exploit trust and undermine it.157  Where people believe
that the legal framework deters sellers from misbehaving, they are more
likely to trust unknown sellers.158  Finally, consumers should be able to trust
that commensurate punishments are imposed on those who break the rules 
and undermine the system. 
In conclusion, higher fines in country of origin cases may be required 
to offset the strong economic incentive traders have to behave unethically
and exploit consumers’ trust.  They may also be justified given the high
monitoring costs, on the one hand, and the potential broader harm to society
that such dishonest statements entail, on the other.  Trust and trustworthiness, 
both in terms of interpersonal trust and confidence in the government, are 
of significant value.159  Sellers should not be allowed to opportunistically
undermine such values.  Simply put, consumers should be able to trust the 
legal system to penalize opportunistic behaviors that erode trust and harm 
society.
 155. Chen, DC Auckland CRI 2012-004-019312 at [16]. 
156.  The court in Chen noted that the Commerce Commission only executed search 
warrants on the defendants because consumers complained to Tourism New Zealand. Id.
at [19]. 
157. For a similar point in a different context, see Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, 
A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 1717, 1760–61 (2006) (“Where 
consumer protections exist, they enable consumers to rest assured that the terms of their
contracts will comply with minimum standards of reasonableness.”) (footnote omitted).
158. Cf.  KOHN, supra note 118, at 113 (noting that people seem to trust strangers 
around them in public because surveillance cameras deter people from misbehaving). 
159. See OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016, at 128 (2016). 
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D. Industry, Tourism, and Other Aggravating Factors 
Another aspect that may be worth considering in such cases is the industry 
in which the misleading or deceptive claims are made.  While courts at times 
consider some of these aspects, such consideration seems to be partial and
haphazard. Accounting for the industry or market in which the defendant 
operates in a more systematic way may contribute to a more holistic analysis. 
This Section highlights three specific facets: (1) sensitivity to unscrupulous 
behavior; (2) health related claims and scientific language; and (3) association 
and New Zealand tourism. While these do not constitute an exclusive list,
they provide an important starting point for expanding the legal analysis.
They also help to structure the evaluative component of such cases,160 
making them more predictable, justified, and coherent.
1. Sensitivity to Unscrupulous Behavior
The “premium” that comes with using the New Zealand label results in 
the tourism industry being relatively sensitive to misconduct.  This is particularly
true with products that tourists associate with New Zealand.  There is an 
awareness that misleading or deceptive labeling can harm tourism and, thus,
the economy.161  The string of alpaca and merino cases illustrate this,162 
as does Topline.163 
Let us focus on Topline, which involved the bee product industry164 and 
as such provides various interesting and valuable points.  The honey and 
bee products industry is a fast-growing, innovative, and science-based industry.
In recent years, there has been an exceptional rise in the popularity of 
honey and bee products.165  In New Zealand, the beekeeping industry’s
estimated worth is $5 billion.166  During the 2015/2016 season, there were
more than 800,000 registered hives and an annual estimated honey crop 
of approximately 20,000.167 
160.  Recall the “evaluative exercise” discussed supra text accompanying note 88. 
161. See, e.g., Chen, DC Auckland CRI-2012-004-019312 at [13]. 
162. The Commerce Commission appears to be targeting misleading behavior with
respect to alpaca products in the tourist market. See Alpaca Case, supra note 9. The 
violations stemmed from false country of origin claims or mislabeling wool content. Id.
 163. See Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 (N.Z.). 
164. Id. 
165. See Ian Harman, Catch the Buzz—Global Honey Industry Set to Expand at a
Compound Annual Growth Rate of 2.6%, BEE CULTURE (May 24, 2018), https://www.bee 
culture.com/catch-the-buzz-global-honey-industry-set-to-expand-at-a-compound-annual­
growth-rate-of-2-6/ [https://perma.cc/CYS4-U6RX].
166. About, APICULTURE N.Z., https://apinz.org.nz/about/ [https://perma.cc/RAM2-26EU]. 
167. Id.
562
POST BECHER_LAI PAGES - 9.17 (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2018 9:50 AM           
 














   
   
  
    
   
 
 
     
 










   
 
  
[VOL. 55:  539, 2018] In Consumer Protection We Trust? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Bee products have been scientifically researched for a wide range of
uses.168  In line with this research, firms that market such products claim
that bee products may increase energy, reduce stress, improve sleep quality
and skin condition, and enhance immunity and performance.169 Moreover, 
bee products are often portrayed as a “natural source of nutrients, vitamins
and minerals,” with the potential of promoting health, strength, mental 
stamina, endurance, and well-being.170  Producers can benefit from the
clean imagery of New Zealand, making said products even more appealing.
Unsurprisingly, then, some of New Zealand’s bee products—especially
mānuka honey171—have been praised and endorsed by international stars 
and celebrities.172 
Unfortunately, the booming industry and the substantial amounts of money 
involved also make this market more susceptible to—or alluring for—unethical 
and illegal activity.  Unscrupulous, motivated actors have been involved 
in hive theft, vandalism, adulteration, and bee poisoning.173  Likewise, the 
168. See, e.g., Jan W Dobrowolski et al., Antibacterial, Antifungal, Antiamoebic,
Antiinflammatory and Antipyretic Studies on Propolis Bee Products, 35 J.ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY
77, 81–82 (1991); INT’L BEE RES. ASS’N, www.ibrabee.org.uk [https://perma.cc/7G2A­
95MR]; Bee World, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE, www.tandfonline.com/toc/tbee20/ current.
169. See, e.g., Angela, RNCP, Bee Pollen Energy, POLLENBUZZ, https://www.bee­
pollen-buzz.com/bee-pollen-energy.html [https://perma.cc/532T-4RMK]. 
170. Bee Pollen Facts, SWEETREE, https://www.sweetreehoney.co.nz/More+Info/Bee+ 
Pollen+Facts.html [https://perma.cc/R9SZ-AJNK].
171. See Mānuka Honey, MINISTRY FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES, https://www.mpi.govt.nz/
growing-and-harvesting/honey-and-bees/manuka-honey/.
172. These include well-known stars, such as Britney Spears, Kim Kardashian, and
Novak Djokovic. See Nina Burton, Australia Stung by Manuka Honey Trademark, NEWSHUB
(Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2016/08/australia-stung­
by-manuka-honey-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/NT3M-XMGG]; Gerard Hutching, 
‘The Great Manuka Honey Swindle’ Under the Spotlight Again in the UK, NZFARMER
(Aug. 21 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/farming/83372041/the-great­
manuka-honey-swindle-under-the-spotlight-again-in-the-uk; Kirsty Wynn & Jonathan Milne, 
The Land of Bad Milk and Fake Honey, SUNSHINE COAST DAILY (Aug. 25, 2013, 8:37 
AM), https://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/land-bad-milk-and-fake-honey/1996676/.
173. Alan Harman, Manuka Honey Thefts in New Zealand, BEE CULTURE (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.beeclture.com/manuka-honey-thefts-in-new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/
ZS7W-C34V].  For media coverage, see, for example, Big Reward Offered as Bee Colonies
Stolen, RADIO N.Z. NEWS (July 25, 2016, 5:24 PM), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/ 
country/309412/big-reward-offered-as-bee-colonies-stolen [https://perma.cc/LVG3-TFK3];
Hawke’s Bay Honey Company Stung by Theft, RADIO N.Z. NEWS (Sept. 2, 2017, 1:02 PM),
https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/338552/hawke-s-bay-honey-company-stung-by-theft
[https://perma.cc/A3Z9-5WNT]; Eleanor Ainge Roy, Honey Wars: Crime and Killings in New
Zealand’s Booming Manuka Industry, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www. 
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temptation to market and sell honey products as New Zealand made, or as 
mānuka,174 has solid economic grounds.  The amounts involved, and the unique 
nature of this market, may further justify attentive consumer protection and,
thus, high fines. 
Cases like Topline175 should be placed in a wider context, one in which 
traders strive to strengthen consumers’ trust and confidence.  Ensuring
that products are known for their authenticity and integrity is essential for 
the sector’s reputation and growth.176  Fresh stains on the reputation of mānuka
honey still echo in consumers’ minds.177  To restore and preserve consumers’
trust it is pertinent to keep this industry free of dishonest traders.  As noted 
in Wild Nature—an alpaca case—“[t]here is a need for accountability 
which has to sheet home the responsibility to protect an industry which is 
of major importance nationally.”178 
2. Health Related Claims and Scientific Language
Certain industries are particularly sensitive due to the health-related claims 
that traders in the market make.179  For example, in 2016, a case was brought
pertaining to ice cream that was marketed as “Frozen Yoghurt” and over 
which health benefits were claimed.180  In sentencing, the court referred
to the defendants’ conduct as “a cynical attempt to take advantage of consumers 
theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/manuka-honey-wars-new-zealand-crime-booming­
industry-poisoning-beatings [https://perma.cc/5MC6-5RPC].
174. See Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 4:18-cv-04418 (N.D. Cal. filed July 20, 
2018) (alleging the defendant’s labelling of their honey product as “100% New Zealand 
Manuka Honey” constitutes misleading practices in marketing, advertising, labelling, and 
promotion).
175. See Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 (N.Z.). 
176. See Membership Benefits, APICULTURE N.Z., https://apinz.org.nz/membership­
benefits/ [https://perma.cc/U8SW-NAUQ].  As a result, attempts are being made to allow 
consumers to check provenance.  One example is with Quick Response (QR) Codes. See 
Justine Murray, Kai Ora Honey–People Over Profit, RADIO N.Z. (Feb. 11, 2018, 6:06 PM),
https://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/teahikaa/audio/2018631318/kai-ora­
honey-people-over-profit [https://perma.cc/XQZ4-APMF]. Another example is a certification
trademark (Trademark No 1025914—open for public inspection at the time of writing).
A third example is at the governmental level, with a scientific definition of “mānuka” for 
export products, including four chemical compounds and one DNA marker (Mānuka
Honey, MINISTRY FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (Feb. 5, 2018), www.mpi.govt.nz). 
177. This results from the matter receiving considerable media coverage.  See, e.g., 
Rob Stock, Manuka Industry Unites in Face of Honey ‘Double Whammy,’ STUFF (Feb. 12, 
2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/89229598/manuka-industry-unites-in­
face-of-honey-double-whammy. 
178. Commerce Comm’n v. Wild Nature NZ Ltd. DC Auckland CRI-2012-063-003511, 
12 December 2014 at [3].
179. This sensitivity has not gone unnoticed.  See generally Natural Health and 
Supplementary Products Bill 2011 (324-2) (N.Z.). 
180. See generally Commerce Comm’n v. Frozen Yoghurt Ltd. [2016] NZDC 19792 (N.Z.). 
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desire to make healthier food choices,”181 as yoghurt is perceived to have
health benefits, whereas ice cream is considered unhealthy.  Health related 
claims, though not necessarily associated with country of origin statements, 
are often yet another type of credence quality that consumers need to be 
able to trust.  Because promises of increased health and improved well-being 
are powerful ways to promote products, special scrutiny seems warranted in
such cases. 
Health related claims are widespread. In the context of country of origin
cases, recall Topline claims, which implied that consumption of bee products 
is likely to improve one’s well-being.182  Bee pollen is considered to be rich 
in protein and is “consumed for its nutrient benefits.”183  Topline—as well 
as other traders—claim that potentiation turns the bee pollen into a superior 
product, making it “more digestible for humans.”184  As the Court noted, 
“Topline marketed NatureBee as a superior bee pollen supplement due to its 
‘potentiated’ quality.”185  For instance, for more than three years Topline’s
website communicated to consumers its aspiration “to make [a] premium 
New Zealand made health food product for the whole family.”186 
In addition, Topline’s advertising and health claims were accompanied 
by scientific language, aimed at supporting some of its claims.187  Topline
stated that “New Zealand bee pollen is the best quality you can buy, and 
with our unique proprietary method of cracking open the hard cells, NatureBee 
Potentiated pollen is more bio-available than any pollen in the world.”188 
Scientific language leads people to believe that the product described is a 
good product.189  People are more easily influenced by scientific jargon 
making such statements more persuasive.  This, once again, highlights the 
necessity for a vigilant and strict approach to misleading labeling. 
181. Id. at [4].
182. See generally Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 (N.Z.). 
183. Id. at [13]. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at [12]. 
186. Id. at [20]. 
187. See id. at [22].
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. CHABRIS & DANIEL J. SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA
AND OTHER WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US 140–42 (2010). 
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3. Association and Tourism 
Misleading or deceptive labeling that states or implies that something 
is made in New Zealand is typically used to associate the product with 
nature and a clean environment—yet another type of credence attribute. 
Relating products to nature and a clean environment can be an influential 
marketing strategy, as it may portray products as more desirable while 
promoting consumers’ trust.190  Moreover, misleading consumers in such cases
in tempting.
For example, in Mi Woollies, the label stated that New Zealand’s “purest 
water and air on earth, ensuring the clean green fields yield only the finest
raw materials for Mi Woollies natural products.”191  The court stated that 
this was a calculated and blatant attempt to mislead consumers.192 The
defendant took “advantage of the premium attached to New Zealand made 
products,” particularly in the tourist market, which allowed the defendant “to
sell its products when it otherwise might not have sold them.”193 
Similarly, Topline’s website promoted its products: “Made from 100%
natural ingredients, the bee pollen we use is harvested by those who know 
it best, the hardworking bees of New Zealand’s pristine wilderness.”194 
Topline also asserted that “New Zealand’s clean, green and sustainable
environment is home to the best quality, wild sourced, raw, potentiated 
bee pollen available.”195  Likewise, in a screened infomercial, Topline’s
director affirmed that “our pollen is collected from the wilderness of New
Zealand’s pristine South Island, hundreds of miles away from any people,
any civilization, away from spraying, away from fertilisers . . . so we know that
it is the most pure, clean environment that the pollen’s coming from.”196 
Overall, defendants in country of origin cases take advantage of consumers’ 
trust and exploit their preference for scientifically proven, healthy, and
environmentally friendly products.  In particular, such cases portray traders 
falsely and cynically linking their products to a clean, green image.  This
is another possible aggravating factor, and it provides another legitimate 
rationale for inflicting high penalties.   
190. Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291at [13], [18] (N.Z.).  For further 
discussion on the way “country as brand” may attract tourists see, for example, Kotler & 
Gertner, supra note 127, at 255–56. 
191. Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009-009069, 
31 July 2013 at [8] (N.Z.). 
192. 
193. 




Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 at [20] (N.Z.). 
Id. 
196. Id. at [23]. 
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Skepticism towards environmental claims has already led some countries
to introduce green guides aimed at minimizing “greenwashing.”  For example,
the FTC issued “Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims.”197 
Courts ought to step in and supplement these efforts in an open-minded
way.
III. CONCLUSION
Policymakers seek to balance protecting consumers’ interests on the one
hand and refraining from excessively intervening and regulating markets
on the other.  Naturally, consumer law focuses on prohibiting unfair behavior 
and promoting fair conduct and practices.  Easier said than done. 
Country of origin and other credence cases illustrate that there is often 
more to consumer law cases than initially meets the eye.  As markets become
more complex and fast-changing, the need to develop consumer law and
bring—and keep—it up-to-speed becomes increasingly important.198  We
hope that by offering a multi-dimensional perspective on the penalties
imposed in country of origin cases, this Article contributes to that end. 
197. Guide for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R § 260 (2012); 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE GREEN GUIDES (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
attachments/press-releases/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides/greenguidesstatement.pdf 
[https:// perma.cc/9NSF-S445].
198. For a recent illustration, see Samuel Becher, Hongzhi Hao & Jessica Lai, How 
Better Tests and Legal Deterrence Could Clean Up the Sticky Mess Left Behind by Fake 







































   




IV. APPENDIX A 

NEW ZEALAND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN CASES UNDER THE 

FAIR TRADING ACT OF 1986 

YEAR199  CASE NAME  CONDUCT AND OUTCOME
1988 Farmers Trading Co. v. 
Commerce Commission200 
Goods labeled “Made in New 
Zealand” when they were made in
China.  
 Charged under FTA, section 
13(j): convicted.
 Penalty: $26,000.
 Conviction upheld on appeal to
the High Court.
1990 Commerce Commission v. 
Parrs (New Zealand)
Souvenirs Ltd.201 
Defendant placed “New Zealand”
sticker over “made in Taiwan” on
100 “sheep noise” souvenirs.
 Charged under FTA ss 10(1), 
13(j).
 Held: dismissed.
1990 Marcol Manufacturers, 
Ltd. v. Commerce
Commission202 
Leather jackets made in Korea
represented as being made in
Christchurch, New Zealand.  
Upon import they had a “Made in
Korea” label, which were
removed and replaced with 
Marcol Christchurch New
Zealand or Marcol Christchurch. 
 Charged under FTA, section 
13(j): convicted.
 Conviction upheld on appeal to
the High Court.
199. This is the year the case was filed rather than the year a decision was handed
down or published. 
200. Farmers Trading Co. Ltd. v. Commerce Comm’n (1988) 2 TCLR 370 (HC) at 1, 6. 
201. See generally Commerce Comm’n v. Parrs (N.Z.) Souvenirs, Ltd. (1990) 3
TCLR 431 (DC).
202. Marcol Mfrs. Ltd v. Commerce Comm’n [1991] 2 NZLR 502 (HC) at 510–12. 
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2004 Commerce Commission v. 
Brownlie Bros.203 
Misleading consumers into
believing that “Simply Squeezed” 
and “Supreme Orange Juice” only 
comprised of squeezed New 
Zealand and/or Australian orange
juice when a proportion of the 
juice was concentrate imported 
from Brazil. 
 Two charges under FTA section
10: convicted. 
 Penalty: $35,000.
2007 Commerce Commission v. 
Knight Business Furniture, 
Ltd.204 
Office chairs built in New 
Zealand using components 
manufactured in Taiwan, China 
and Italy; components built to
defendant’s specifications.  Chairs 
were advertised as “NZ Made” 
with a brochure with the silver 
fern—a famous symbol of New 
Zealand.  Held to be built in New 
Zealand, but not made in New 
Zealand. 
 Four charges under FTA section
10: dismissed. 
 Four charges under FTA section
13(j): convicted.
 Penalty: $5,000. 
2010 Commerce Commission v. 
Prokiwi Int’l, Ltd.205 
Packaging soap and skincare 
products with New Zealand 
symbols, “New Zealand” in a 
manner similar to the well-known
"Buy New Zealand Made" trade 
mark, with the red kiwi in a blue 
203. Commerce Comm’n v. Brownlie Bros. [2005] DCR 219 at [4], [18]. 
204. Commerce Comm’n v. Knight Bus. Furniture, Ltd. DC New Plymouth CRN 
06043500833-40, 14 September 2007 at [2]–[3], [86]. 
205. See generally Commerce Comm’n v. Prokiwi Int’l Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI­
2010-009-009397, 9 August 2010 (N.Z.). 
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and red triangle.  Goods were
made from Chinese or Asian 
ingredients and imported into
New Zealand. 
 Seventeen charges under FTA
section 10: convicted.
 Penalty: $48,000.
2012 Commerce Commission v. 
Mi Woollies206 
Footwear labeled “UGG New
Zealand” and “New Zealand 
Owned & Operated,” when they 
were made in China and made 
predominantly from Australian
sheepskin.
 Five charges under FTA section
10: convicted. 
 Five charges under FTA section
13(j): convicted.
 Penalty: $63,000.
2012 Commerce Commission v. 
Wild Nature NZ, Ltd.207 
Sold “New Zealand Made” 
Alpaca rugs that were from Peru, 
and duvets labeled as containing
exclusively or predominantly 
alpaca or merino wool fibre, when
the alpaca fibres were only a small 
part of the duvet mix and the
merino duvets had no merino.
 Company–thirty-seven charges 
under the FTA: convicted. 
 Director–thirty charges under 
the FTA: convicted.
 Company Penalty: $243,444.
 Director Penalty: $25,000.
 Total Penalty: $268,444. 
2013 Commerce Commission v. 
Chen208 
Top Sky Holdings labeled alpaca 
rugs as being made in New
 206. Commerce Comm’n v. Mi Woollies, Ltd. DC Christchurch CRI 2012-009­
009069, 31 July 2013 at [3], [8], [44]–[45] (N.Z.) . 
207. Commerce Comm’n v. Wild Nature NZ Ltd. DC Auckland CRI-2012-063­
003511, 12 December 2014 at [7], [13], [33]–[37]. 
208. Commerce Comm’n v. Chen DC Auckland CRI 2012-004-019312, 28 March
2013 at [4], [7], [26]–[29] (N.Z.). 
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Zealand when in fact they were 
imported from Peru. Top Sky
Holdings and Kiwi Wool label led
duvets as being predominantly
containing alpaca fibers, when
they did not, or containing merino
wool when they did not. Twenty-
month period and the defendants
made millions of dollars. 
 Top Sky Holdings–ten charges 
under the FTA section 10; two 
charges under the FTA section 
13(j): convicted.
 Haidong Chen (Director of Top 
Sky Holdings)–ten charges
under the FTA section 10:
convicted.
 Kiwi Wool Ltd.–eighteen
charges under the FTA section 
13(j): convicted.
 Jinming Chen (Director of Kiwi
Wool)–eighteen charges under 
the FTA section 13(j): 
convicted.
 Haidong Chen (Shareholder of
Kiwi Wool)–eighteen charges










Kiwi Wool Ltd. $ 84,000
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any, $105,000  
(retailer) 

















$ 24,500  
(retailer) 
































Jung $ 6,700  
209. Premium Alpaca Ltd. v. Commerce Comm’n [2014] NZHC 1836 at [5], [15], 
[20], [34]–[39] (N.Z.). 
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 Penalty: $22,000. 
Commerce C
Hou211  
ommission v. 2016 
as “alpaca” a
Zealand,” whe
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210. Commerce Comm’n v. BGV Int’l, Ltd. DC Auckland CRI-2012-004-017226, 23 
October 2014 at [1] and [26] (N.Z.). 
211. Commerce Comm’n v. Hou [2016] NZDC 9291at [25], [33]–[36] (N.Z.). 
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old limit, two under new limit: 
convicted.
 Director Penalty: $5,600 + 
$12,600 = $18,200.
 Total Penalty: $109,200. 
2016 Commerce Commission v. 
Budge Collection Ltd.212 
Imported duvets from China and
repacked them as “made in New 
Zealand” and “alpaca,” when
neither was true.  Around five­
and-a-half months of offending
under the old limit and nine-and­
a-half months of offending under 
the new limit..  
 Company–four charges under 
FTA section 13(a): convicted. 
 Company Penalty: 
$63,000+$28,000 = $57,000. 
 Director–four charges under 
FTA section 13(a): convicted. 
 Director Penalty: $5,600 + 
$12,600 = $14,250.
 Total Penalty: $71,250. 




January 2008 to September
2013—and goats’ milk powder— 
from August 2012 to October 
2012—were labeled as “New
Zealand Made.”  The powder was 
also labeled with “100% NZ made
& proud of it.”  The goat’s milk
powder was sourced from Spain 
and the Netherlands.  
 Charged under FTA ss 9–10, 
13(j).
 Declaration of contravention.
 212. Commerce Comm’n v. Budge Collection, Ltd. [2016] NZDC 15542 at [4], [7],
[36] (N.Z.).
213. Commerce Comm’n v. N.Z. Nutritionals (2004) Ltd [2016] NZHC 832 at [1],
[12], [67]. 
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2017 Commerce Commission v. 
























































































































 Company–twenty-two charges 
under FTA section 10–twelve







































































 Total Penalty: $526,500. 
214. Commerce Comm’n v. Topline Int’l, Ltd. [2017] NZDC 9221 at [2], [40]–[41] 
(N.Z.).
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